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Structured Abstract: 
 
Purpose 
The paper’s objective is to contribute to existing literature by examining whether development 
aid has any measurable impact on food security, whether the impact is conditioned on the 
quality of governance, and whether it differs based on the type of aid provided. 
 
Methodology 
Panel-data analysis of 85 developing countries between 1994 and 2011, employing GMM and 
2SLS estimators. 
 
Findings 
The paper finds that aid in general has a small positive impact on food security; that multilateral 
aid, grants, and social and economic aid have a positive effect on food security in their own 
right; and that bilateral aid, loans, and agricultural aid are more conditioned on the quality of 
governance that other aid. 
 
Research Limitations 
The main limitations rest with the imperfect nature of cross-country data on food security and 
governance, which I have tried to overcome through a series of robustness tests. 
 
Practical Implications 
The findings suggest that aid, despite its many deficiencies, can play a positive role in 
strengthening food security. Furthermore, they indicate that concessional loans, bilateral aid, 
and agricultural aid are likely to foster food security only in countries with better governance. 
 
Originality/Value 
The paper constitutes a novel contribution to existing literature because it is one of the first to 
use cross-country data to explore the impact of aid on food security and because it utilizes a 
relatively complex aid categorization, which allows its conclusions to be more nuanced. 
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Introduction 
Food security worldwide experienced significant improvements in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. However, events from recent years, including the 2008 global food price 
crisis and the 2012 famines in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa suggest that this positive trend 
has been reversed (Webb, 2010). Growing world population, diversifying consumption 
patterns in China and India, and deteriorating climate conditions are exerting an ever increasing 
pressure on the world’s food resources and thereby worsening global food availability and food 
access (Leisinger et al., 2002). 
Policy practitioners and researchers widely agree that countries adversely affected by food 
insecurity should invest greater funds into efforts addressing the problem. Nevertheless, many 
developing countries lack the ability to mobilize sufficient resources domestically. One 
potential way to fill these financial gaps is through development aid and advanced economies 
have been quite vocal about their desire to strengthen food security through financial 
assistance. For example, at the 2009 summit in l’Aquila, Italy, the G8 countries promised to 
donate 22 billion USD to global food-security efforts over the following three years (G8, 2009). 
At the end only half the funds were delivered but the 2012 G8 summit conclusions reiterated 
the countries’ commitment to continue tackling global food insecurity through development 
aid (G8, 2012). 
Existing research has investigated the link between aid and economic growth quite 
extensively but the relationship between development assistance and food security remains 
largely unexplored. Here, I hope to fill this void and then proceed beyond it. Aid from different 
donors, in different forms, and to different sectors may have varying impacts on its recipients’ 
food security. Moreover, the quality of the beneficiaries’ institutions and policies might have a 
bearing on the relationship as well. In this paper I examine whether aid, generally and in its 
various forms, has any measurable effect on food security and whether this effect is influenced 
by the recipients’ quality of governance. I carry out the analysis on a cross-country level of all 
developing countries, rather than on a regional or national level, in order to ensure greater data 
availability and reveal a global pattern of aid-food security relationships. 
 
Food security, development aid, and governance 
 
Defining the key concepts 
Both the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) define food security as a state in which ‘all people at all times have access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food to maintain an active and healthy life.’ Food security thus rests on four 
pillars – food availability, access to food, food utilization[1], and stability of the previous three 
pillars (Barrett, 2002). Food security and its reverse, food insecurity, embody ex ante 
conditions, with states such as hunger, malnutrition and undernourishment the corresponding 
ex post concepts. Due to a lack of suitable data, it is only the ex post conditions which can be 
measured comparatively on the global scale. Available candidates in this regard include food 
insecurity measures calculated periodically by the FAO, such as the prevalence of 
undernourishment, and children’s nutritional indicators provided by the WHO. These variables 
do not capture the full complexity of food insecurity but, as Svedberg (2000) implies, if used 
in combination they can act as valid approximates. 
Development aid refers to the financial flows from richer to poorer countries, with the main 
official goal of promoting economic, social, political and environmental development 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2003). No unified 
classification of aid exists; however, for the purposes of this paper I suggest a simple division 
according to three dimensions: who provides aid, how it is disbursed, and where it goes.  
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In the first category, based on the donor’s identity, the obvious categorization is into aid 
provided by multilateral and by bilateral agencies. In the second category, which examines how 
aid is distributed, I include two divisions, one into grants and concessional loans and one into 
budget support versus program and project aid. In the last dimension of aid categorization, 
according to where aid flows, I use a division of aid based on the sector where it was invested 
– in agriculture, in social infrastructure, in economic infrastructure or in the remaining 
sectors[3]. This specific categorization has not been used by researchers thus far but seems very 
relevant when investigating the effect of aid on food security, as mostly agricultural aid tends 
to be linked with food security, at least on the household level (e.g. Berti et al, 2003; IYCN, 
2011). 
Governance as a theoretical concept is still only in its embryonic stage, as Abdellatif 
(2003:3) points out, and hence its precise definition often varies in line with authors’ differing 
ideological convictions. Some believe that it represents the process by which authority in a 
country is exercised, others understand it as the mechanisms and institutions that enable such 
process, while yet others include in the definition also the outcomes of the process, i.e. policies 
(ibid). The donor world became interested in measuring the quality of governance in the 
developing world after papers by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Scully (1988) suggested 
that aid had a more positive effect on growth in countries with better institutions and policies. 
The World Bank and the OECD eventually followed with their own definition of ‘good’ 
governance, to which I adhere in this paper, as institutions and policies that are ‘participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and 
inclusive, and follow the rule of law’ (OECD, 2003). 
 
The aid-food security-governance link, in theory and in reality 
 On the macro level, researchers have to date studied predominantly the impact of aid on 
countries’ economic growth. However, raising growth rates is only one of several objectives 
that development aid purportedly aims to achieve. As mentioned above, the main official goal 
of development assistance is to encourage economic, social, political, and environmental 
development and thus contribute to comprehensive poverty alleviation. Since food security 
constitutes a key element of poverty alleviation[4], all development aid should on paper be 
making its recipients more food secure. Examining whether that has indeed been the case is 
hence important. 
 Since food security constitutes a multifaceted phenomenon, its theoretical link with aid is 
also complex. Through its impact on growth, aid might affect the food supply aspect of food 
security. By helping to raise per-capita income levels, aid can strengthen the access-to-food 
aspect. The connection between aid and the third pillar of food security is less straightforward, 
but by improving nutritional education and health and sanitation infrastructure, aid could 
contribute to improving people’s food utilization. Finally, aid is also likely to have an impact 
on the last aspect of food security, stability, but even in theory it is hard to identify its direction 
as it depends on the country’s specific situation, including its relationship with donors. Despite 
this ambiguity, in theory aid flows should be helping countries reduce domestic food insecurity. 
 Whether this hypothesis holds in reality remains largely a matter of empirical investigation, 
however. As I mentioned, very few researchers thus far investigated the relationship between 
aid and food security specifically even though works on aid effectiveness in other areas of 
development abound. An overwhelming majority of literature on the effect of aid on growth 
found a significant and positive impact (e.g. Bhavan et al., 2011; Lensink and White, 2001; 
Burnside and Dollar, 2000) even though some studies suggested that the results were fragile to 
changing specifications and samples (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009). The research on the 
effects of aid on income levels and poverty reduction is less conclusive but still leans towards 
positive findings (Kosack, 2003; Masud and Yontcheva, 2005). The effects of aid on sectors 
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that could improve food utilization, such as education, health, and water and sanitation, have 
been less studied but some works did discover a positive relationship (e.g. Mishra and 
Newhouse, 2007; Dreher et al., 2008). On the other hand, research indicates that at least in 
some situations aid negatively affects the stability aspect of food security, by exacerbating 
recessions with its pro-cyclical downturns (Bulir and Hamann, 2008).  
 The cautious optimism with which researchers generally view aid effectiveness is not quite 
replicated with regard to the intervening role of ‘good’ governance. In theory it appears 
probable that aid works better in countries with more accountable and less corrupt institutions 
and policies. However, although many researchers indeed concluded that the impact of aid was 
more pronounced in countries with better governance (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Clemens 
et al., 2004), others found the quality of governance to be of no significance (Dalgaard and 
Hansen, 2001; Morrissey, 2004). 
 
The role of aid heterogeneity 
 Aid constitutes a highly varied flow of funds and hence it appears likely that some types 
might be more beneficial to development objectives, food security included, than others. It has 
not become common practice thus far to open the ‘black box’ of aid when examining aid 
effectiveness empirically but some studies on the heterogeneous effects of different aid 
modalities do exist. Vis-à-vis who gives aid, multilateral aid should theoretically be more 
supportive of official development objectives than bilateral aid since political and commercial 
interests are less likely to play a role in its disbursements. For the same reasons, ‘good’ 
governance is probably more important in ensuring the effectiveness of bilateral aid. Existing 
research has shown the first claim to generally hold true (Balogh, 1967; Burnside and Dollar, 
2000) but has to date not examined validity of the second one.  
 The consequences of the decision how to deliver aid are more theoretically ambiguous. 
Regarding the division of aid into grants and concessional loans, grants could be seen as the 
more beneficial mechanisms since they do not indebt the recipients’ governments. On the other 
hand, they could cultivate a culture of dependency, thereby weakening the recipients’ own 
institutions and their resilience. Empirical findings have supported both points of view (Bullow 
and Rogoff, 2005; Djankov et al., 2006). Nonetheless, whichever the truth, governance should 
play a more pronounced role in ensuring the positive effect of loans since their administration 
- particularly the fact that they have to be repaid – requires greater fiscal discipline from the 
recipients. However, this argument has not been empirically proven so far.   
 Regarding the choice between program/project aid and budget support, budget support can 
be seen as a more useful financing mechanism as it is provided directly to governments and 
hence does not create an alternative administrative structure as projects and programs might do 
(Devarajan and Swaroop, 1998, Crola, 2009). On the other hand, similar to the case of loans, 
budget support is likely to be more susceptible to the influence of governance because it relies 
to a larger extent on domestic actors, institutions, and policies than program and project aid. 
Previous research indeed suggested that governance might play a significant conditioning role 
in aid effectiveness (Cordella and Dell’Arricia, 2003) and consequently some donors, notably 
the European Commission, use the strictest form of conditionality in their disbursements of 
budget support. 
As mentioned already, the classification of aid according to where it flows is into 
agricultural, social, economic, and other aid. Theoretically, one could expect aid to agriculture 
to have a more positive impact on food security than aid to any other sector as it specifically 
aims at improving food production. Some researchers proved the existence of a positive link 
between agricultural aid and food security empirically but predominantly on the micro level 
(e.g. IYCN, 2011). Social and economic aid should in theory also bolster food security, through 
better health, education, and economic opportunities but it is easy to imagine situations in 
5 
 
which such desired outcome is not achieved because the aid provided fails to reach the truly 
impoverished layers of society. 
 
Summary of hypotheses 
In light of the theoretical postulations and existing research, I expect to find that aid in 
general has a positive although not a very robust impact on food security. I am less confident 
with regard to the conditioning effect of governance. Logically I would anticipate the impact 
of aid to appear more positive in countries with a higher quality of institutions and policies but 
empirical research has not always confirmed this provision to hold true.  
When investigating the heterogeneous impact of aid on food security, I expect to find 
multilateral aid to be more beneficial than bilateral aid, grants to be more beneficial than loans, 
and agricultural aid to bolster food security more than other types of aid. Regarding the 
conditioning role of ‘good’ governance in different aid types, I conjecture that it is significant 
primarily in ensuring the positive impact of bilateral aid, concessional loans, and budget 
support.  
 
Data 
 
Food (in)security 
As food insecurity measures, I use the FAO’s prevalence of undernourishment and the 
WHO’s proportion of children younger than five years that are underweight (too light for age). 
The two variables measure similar but not identical concepts. Most notably, the underweight 
indicator is a more conservative measure of food insecurity as parents generally do their utmost 
to feed their children adequately even if they lack the resources to do so for themselves (Dinour 
et al., 2007). Consequently, mild food insecurity might result in raising undernourishment 
prevalence in adults without affecting the prevalence of underweight children.  
 
Development aid  
Data on official development assistance (ODA) flows are available from the Credit 
Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD. Data on aid flows in general and on the divisions into 
bilateral and multilateral aid as well as into grants and loans are available in constant 2011 
USD disbursements. Unfortunately, disbursement data divided according to the sectors where 
the aid was spent are available only after 2002 and incomplete. Therefore, in these instances I 
use data on the aid committed, available from 1995 onwards.  
In examining the impact of aid on food security in general, I follow majority of researchers 
and use a measure of aid disbursed per recipient’s GDP (natural logarithm, lagged by one time 
period). Nevertheless, since the categorization of aid is available only for gross aid flows, 
instead of using only net aid receipts as most researchers do, I use data on gross aid receipts 
and control for repayments (following Clemens et al., 2004).  
When investigating the differential impact of multilateral versus bilateral aid, I substitute 
ODA per GDP with bilateral aid per GDP and multilateral aid per GDP. I follow the same logic 
with respect to the divisions into grants and concessional loans, and into agricultural, economic, 
social, and other aid. In these categorizations, I abide by the existing groupings within the CRS 
database. However, when exploring the impact of general budget support on recipients as 
opposed to the effect of program/project aid, I include a proportion of aid provided as budget 
support together with a measure of total ODA per GDP. I do so because the amount of aid 
provided as budget support is often miniscule relative to the rest of aid and if included in dollar 
terms its impact would be harder to detect.  
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Governance 
As a measure of governance, I considered two different variables. The first option was to 
follow Burnside and Dollar (2000) and use a weighted policy index composed of budget 
balance, trade openness, and inflation. However, while these aspects of governance appear 
relevant when examining the impact of aid on economic growth, they do not seem equally 
important when looking at aid’s effect on food security. Consequently, I opted to use the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI), measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
numbers denoting better governance. The WGI rates countries on six dimensions – voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption - and thus complies more comprehensively with 
the World Bank’s definition of ‘good’ governance cited earlier than the policy index. However, 
as a robustness check, in the sensitivity analysis I examine the impact of aid when conditioned 
on the weighted policy index as well. 
 
Control variables 
Following a wide range of researchers, as control variables I include a logarithm of GDP 
per capita, a logarithm of emergency food aid flows, debt repayments, a dummy variable for 
Least-Developed Countries (LDC), a logarithm of total population, a domestic food production 
index, a global food price index, a conflict dummy variable, a trade openness measure[5], and a 
measure of social and economic rights (Cohen, 1995, Leisinger et al., 2002, Berg and Krueger, 
2003, Kang and Meernik, 2005, del Ninno et al., 2007). All the control variables, just like the 
measures of aid and governance, are used in regressions lagged by one time period to ensure 
the correct temporal sequence. The conflict data came from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 
the rights data from the Cingranelli-Richards’ dataset, and the rest of the variables from the 
World Development Indicators and from the FAO. Initially I also included a measure of 
political and civil rights and a dummy variable for disaster; however, as both appeared 
consistently insignificant I excluded them from the final analysis.  
 
Final dataset 
The final dataset is an unbalanced panel, comprising data in three-year averages from 1994 
to 2011 for 85 developing countries. The year 2011 is the last year for which data were available 
as of the time of research; 1994 was chosen as the lower cut-off point due to the unavailability 
of data on several independent variables prior to that date. The data were averaged over three-
year periods to take into account the potentially cumulative effects of aid (following Burnside 
and Dollar, 2000). 
 
Summary statistics 
 Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for all the variables used in my study. Looking first at 
the dependent variable, the numbers show that global food security improved between the first 
wave and the last wave of the data; however, the percentage reduction in undernourished 
population is more remarkable than in under-five children that are underweight. This finding 
is disappointing to some extent, as undernourishment in the first years of life carries more 
significant negative long-term consequences for human development than undernourishment 
later in life. 
 Regarding the main independent and conditioning variables, Table 1 shows that on average, 
the countries examined received less aid per GDP in 2009-11 than in 1994-1996 but that the 
decrease has been quite small. In all the aid categories assessed there was a decrease except for 
grants and social aid, which slightly increased. Interestingly, the two governance measures 
examined display a varying time trend. Whereas WGI scores on average slightly worsened 
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between the first and the last wave of the data examined, the policy index improved 
significantly. 
 Turning attention to the summary statistics of the control variables utilized, most measures 
increased on average between the first and the last time period under study – including GDP 
per capita, food production index, trade openness, global food prices, and population. It is 
encouraging to see that fewer countries were involved in an active conflict in 2009-11 than in 
1994-96 but less so that the mean score on social and economic rights deteriorated in that time 
frame. Average repayments and emergency food aid declined as well. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of all key variables used 
 
Source: author’s own calculations 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Data on aid and food security suffers from both autocorrelation and endogeneity. The 
Arellano-Bond (1991) test repeatedly shows that food security data is correlated to the first 
order; i.e. that the food security level in the current time period is correlated with the level in 
the previous time period. Regarding endogeneity, aid can hardly be expected to be completely 
Time period
Food (in)security Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
Undernourishment prevalence (%) 22.34 15.48 0.00 60.83 17.02 13.56 0.00 68.37
Underweight children (%, <5 yrs) 19.50 12.88 0.70 51.17 17.01 10.27 3.40 30.92
Development aid
Aid per GDP (xmillion) 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.35 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.40
Bilateral aid per GDP 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.24
Multilateral aid per GDP 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.16
Concessional loans per GDP 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.11
Grants per GDP 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.35 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.40
Budget support per GDP 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05
Program/project aid per GDP 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.35 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.40
Agricultural aid per GDP 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05
Social aid per GDP 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.19
Economic aid per GDP 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10
Other aid per GDP 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.13
Governance
WGI -0.46 0.52 -1.66 1.01 -0.50 0.55 -1.46 1.20
Policy 47.21 112.67 -578.20 158.97 83.24 43.09 17.47 203.27
Control variables Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
GDP(PPP) p.c. 1832 2245 131 12464 2231 2341 152 9029
Emergency food aid p.c. (x10) 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.82 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.41
Population (in millions) 58.2 185.0 0.8 1250.0 69.9 214.0 0.5 1340.0
Food production index 82.5 11.4 48.3 141.6 125.3 17.3 85.7 166.1
Trade openness 69.2 37.3 19.3 215.8 77.9 32.3 24.6 166.3
Social and economic rights 7.73 3.55 0.33 13.67 6.87 3.45 0.00 13.00
Conflict 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
World food price index 1.79 0.37 1.04 2.63 1.91 0.37 1.23 2.86
LDC 0.37 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.50 0.00 1.00
Repayments (in billions) 1.31 3.14 0.00 20.30 1.28 2.83 0.00 15.90
N of observations 75 71
1994-96 2009-11
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exogenous to food security as countries with higher insecurity levels are more likely to receive 
larger amounts of aid.  
The common manner of resolving these problems in the cross-country aid literature is to 
either use two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regressions or dynamic panel regressions (Clemens 
et al., 2004; Dreher et al., 2008). For my primary analysis, in which I examine the impact of 
aid in general on food security, I use both approaches. First, I analyze the data with a two-stage 
least-squares regression with country fixed effects, using the following model: 
 
(1) fit = β0 + β1A’it +  β2G it + β3(A’it*G it) +β4Xit + γt + εfit 
(2) A’it = δ0 + δ 1IVit + δ2Xit + γt + εait 
 
where β0 and δ0 are constants, fit is the prevalence of undernourishment observed for country i in year t, Ait are 
aid receipts per GDP, Git is the quality of governance, Ait*G it  is the aid-governance interaction term (which 
represents the impact of aid on food  that is conditional on governance),  IVit are variables that affect aid but are 
exogenous to undernourishment, Xit are other exogenous variables that affect food security and the allocation of 
aid, γt are unobserved time effects, and εfit and εait are the error terms. Time dummies are included to capture 
worldwide business cycles. 
 
As instruments for aid I considered following Hansen and Tarp (2001), who used among 
other variables GDP per capita and a lagged value of the policy index. However, since policy, 
even in its lagged term, is most likely not exogenous to food security, I turned to Rajan and 
Subramanian’s (2005) instruments instead. In their examination of the aid-growth relationship, 
they exploited that aid tends to be extended also for non-economic reasons and as instruments 
used variables capturing strategic and colonial ties. Modifying their example to suit my own 
data, I use the following variables – three dummy variables that indicate whether the recipient 
country was ever a British colony, a French colony, or another European colony, the countries’ 
performance in political and civil rights, and the number of deaths in a major disaster. The 
underlying logic is that donors tend to give more aid to countries with old colonial ties, with 
better political and civil rights records, and to countries that experienced disasters. 
Overall, these variables account for more than 20 per cent of the donors’ allocation decision 
and unlike policy, they are reasonably exogenous to the dependent variable. The colony 
variables should not be related to food security other than through aid and my initial tests 
suggested that neither political/civil rights nor disasters were significantly correlated with food 
security. Another concern is that the instruments could be correlated with governance and 
thereby violating the exclusion restriction underlying the instrumentation. However, the fact 
that the correlation coefficient between the instruments and the WGI is low (<.2) and not 
statistically significant in my sample should allay this worry. The general insignificance of the 
Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests comparing the 
IV and OLS estimates further strengthen the instruments’ validity[6].  
As a second method, I use the system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and implemented into Stata by Roodman (2006). My 
equation in this case is the following: 
 
fit =fit-1 +β0 + β1Ait + β2G it + β3(Ait*G it)+ β2X it +γt + εit 
 
where fit is the prevalence of undernourishment observed for country i in year t, fit-1 is the prevalence of 
undernourishment in the previous time period (t-1), Ait are aid receipts per GDP, Git is the quality of governance, 
Ait*G it is the aid-governance interaction term (which represents the impact of aid on food that is conditional on 
governance), X it are control variables, γt is the unobserved time effect and εit is the error term.  
 
In the model, I correct for the first-order autocorrelation of the dependent variable and treat 
aid as endogenous, instrumenting for it with its own lag. The Arellano-Bond test of second-
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order autocorrelation and the Hansen test of the exogeneity of instruments strengthen the 
model’s validity.  
When scrutinizing the impact of all aid flows on food security, I report results from both the 
2SLS and the GMM regressions. However, since it is impossible to find relevant instruments 
for all the different types of aid that I examine, I analyze the heterogeneous impacts of the 
various aid modalities using only the GMM estimator.  
 
Impact of General Aid Flows on Food Security 
 
Table 2. The effect of general aid flows on food insecurity, using 2SLS and GMM estimators 
 
Regressions were run with robust standard errors and time dummies. The first number next to each variable is the 
coefficient; the number below is the corresponding t-statistic. Bold font represents significance at least at the 10% 
level. 
 
 Table 2 presents results on the impact of total aid flows on food security. Interestingly, all 
eight regressions in the table indicate the existence of a significant and positive relationship 
Model
Food insecurity measure
Food insecurity (lagged) 1.46 1.46 0.83 1.04
16.43 16.51 14.89 15.42
ODA per GDP -0.72 -0.65 -0.33 -0.32 -1.21 -0.64 -0.26 -0.23
2.45 2.69 2.77 2.08 2.98 2.21 2.09 1.87
Governance 2.55 -0.58 0.09 -0.21 -0.92 -0.61 -0.18 -1.96
0.97 1.65 0.07 0.95 2.01 1.39 0.78 1.49
ODA*governance -0.35 -0.12 -0.21 -0.09
1.66 0.93 2.67 1.55
GDP(PPP) p.c. -7.96 -8.50 -4.45 -4.67 -0.90 -1.37 -1.44 -1.14
2.88 3.44 1.87 1.78 2.13 2.85 2.59 2.86
Population -7.54 -8.70 -5.70 -6.73 -0.38 -0.40 -0.65 -0.66
2.87 2.58 1.97 1.98 2.41 2.53 2.71 2.73
Food production index -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01
3.69 2.54 2.88 2.54 4.66 4.71 1.17 1.25
Emergency food aid p.c. -0.20 -0.10 -0.41 -0.45 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.11
1.51 1.07 3.02 3.27 1.41 0.91 2.35 2.34
Conflict 1.65 1.42 0.64 0.80 -1.39 -1.17 0.43 0.44
1.97 1.54 0.99 1.02 0.92 0.78 1.87 1.76
LDC 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 3.06 3.34 1.58 1.63
1.58 2.58 2.69 1.88 2.60 2.33 1.83 1.88
Repayments 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.29 3.06 0.96 1.21 2.18 0.00 3.15 0.00
N observations
N groups
AR2 test (Prob>z) 0.16 0.16 0.32 0.31
Hansen test (Prob>χ2) 0.59 0.58 0.16 0.19
R2 within 37.48 38.78 37.50 38.26
R2 (first stage regression) 23.55 24.12 23.91 24.51
DWH test (Prob>z) 0.24 0.97 0.07 0.06
Sargan test (Prob>z) 0.81 0.73 0.32 0.32
Undernourished UnderweightUndernourished Underweight
323344
8598
GMM2SLS
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between aid and food security, more consistently so than I expected based on the existing 
research. The coefficients suggest that a one-unit increase in the log of aid per GDP leads to a 
reduction in the prevalence of undernourishment by 0.6-3 percentage points and in the 
proportion of underweight children by 0.2-0.3 percentage points.  
 Governance, on the other hand, does not have a consistently positive effect on food security 
on its own and enhances the effectiveness of aid only when food insecurity is measured through 
undernourishment prevalence. Figure 1 depicts the conditioning role of governance 
graphically, showing that in countries with WGI scores below -1.5, such as Burundi or 
Zimbabwe, aid does not have any significant effect on food security. With improving 
governance scores the effect of aid becomes increasingly significant and at the high end of the 
WGI spectrum aid reduces the prevalence of undernourishment by more than 2 percentage 
points. However, when food insecurity is measured through the prevalence of underweight 
children, the aid-governance interaction term is not significant although it is still negative in 
direction. This inconsistent finding on the conditioning role of governance fits relatively well 
with the existing literature, which is also not united vis-à-vis the question whether governance 
reinforces the effectiveness of aid. 
 
Figure 1. Average marginal effects of aid conditioned on governance (90% confidence interval) 
 
Source: author’s own graphic 
 
 From the control variables included, the most consistently significant are GDP per capita 
and the Least-Developed Country dummy. Not surprisingly, countries with higher GDP per 
capita that are not Least-Developed are on average more food secure. Domestic food 
production, food aid, and population size strengthen food security as well while conflict and 
repayments weaken it. The remaining control variables lack a consistently significant 
relationship with the dependent variables and hence their results are omitted from the table.  
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 A comparison of the regressions in Table 2 yields several observations. First, the 2SLS and 
GMM estimators produced similar results, hence bolstering the findings’ validity from a 
statistical point of view. Second, aid appears to strengthen adults’ food security more than 
children’s. This difference in impact could be caused by the fact that children’s nutritional 
status is more susceptible to sanitary conditions and health than adults’ (Katona and Katona-
Apte, 2008) and the link between aid on the one side and sanitation and health services on the 
other is less straightforward than the link between aid and the reduction of financial poverty 
(which improves people’s access to food). Third, as noted already, the aid-governance 
interaction term is not consistently significant, which goes in line with my conjecture that some 
types of aid are more susceptible to the quality of governance than others and supports my 
decision to explore the effects of different aid modalities on food security. Prior to doing so, 
however, I perform several sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of the results on the impact 
of aid in general on food security, in an effort to assess the soundness of the variables and 
estimators utilized.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
As I mentioned above, in the first sensitivity test I substitute the WGI governance variable 
with the policy index used by Burnside and Dollar (2000). Table 3 displays the results obtained 
and shows that the substitution does not majorly alter the general conclusions reached in the 
basic model. Aid still appears to strengthen recipients’ food security and the impact is stronger 
in countries with better governance when food insecurity is approximated by the prevalence of 
undernourishment. Hence, interestingly, even macroeconomic policies, which are seemingly 
far removed from food insecurity, improve the effectiveness of aid in its reduction. 
Since much of the recent success in improving global food security took place in China and 
in Brazil, the second sensitivity test involves repeating the aid-food security regressions on a 
sample of countries that excludes China and Brazil. The results in Table 3 demonstrate that the 
difference from the original results is very small. This outcome is not surprising seeing that 
although China and Brazil brought tens of millions of people to food security in the recent 
decades, my study measures food security in percentages and thus from a statistical point of 
view, the two countries do not represent extreme outliers. 
The third sensitivity check pertains to the fact that throughout the analyses I use data on 
gross aid rather than on the more commonly utilised net aid. I do so because data on aid 
categorization is available only for gross aid and as an attempt at remedy I control for 
repayments. Nevertheless, in Table 3 I examine the impact of aid on food security using data 
on net aid per capita. The results show that the difference is not overwhelming. The coefficients 
do vary but the broad inference remains the same - aid reinforces food security and its effect 
on undernourishment prevalence is conditioned on governance 
Finally, as a last robustness check, I introduce an aid-squared variable into the regressions, 
to examine whether aid in its positive impact on food security has diminishing returns as it does 
in its effect on growth (e.g. Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). The aid-squared coefficients are 
indeed significant and positive, corroborating the claim of diminishing returns. However, the 
core results do not change dramatically - ODA per GDP still appears negative and significant 
and the interaction variable between aid and governance is negative and significant with 
undernourishment as food insecurity.  
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Table 3. Testing the robustness tests of the basic model 
 
Regressions were run with robust standard errors and time dummies. The first number next to each variable is the 
coefficient; the number below is the corresponding t-statistic. Bold font represents significance at least at the 10% 
level. The regressions were controlled for the same variables as those in Table 2. 
 
Impact of Different Aid Modalities on Food Security 
Table 4 presents the results of regressions that explore the heterogeneous effects of who 
provides aid and how aid is provided on recipients’ food security. Looking first at the division 
of aid into bilateral and multilateral, both types have a positive effect, albeit in the case of 
multilateral aid it is more consistently significant and slightly larger in size. On the other hand, 
and in line with my initial hypotheses, bilateral aid appears to be more significantly conditioned 
on the quality of governance than either multilateral aid or aid in general.  
Turning attention to the division of aid into grants and concessional loans, grants appear to 
be much more directly beneficial for food security than loans. However, loans are more 
consistently conditioned on governance in their effectiveness than grants. While the impact of 
grants seems positively influenced by the quality of governance only when food insecurity is 
measured by the prevalence of undernourishment, as is the case with aid in general, the effect 
Food insecurity measure
ODA per GDP -0.97 -0.94 -0.28 -0.26 -1.23 -0.75 -0.18 -0.17
2.17 2.11 1.92 1.95 2.10 2.24 1.74 1.70
Governance -3.78 -2.24 0.65 0.29 -0.59 -1.04 -0.17 -0.26
2.14 1.91 1.07 0.75 2.00 1.88 1.53 1.75
ODA*governance -0.10 0.00 -0.16 -0.08
2.17 0.43 2.18 1.56
N of observations
N of groups
AR2 test (Prob>z) 0.135 0.230 0.113 0.742 0.122 0.189 0.115 0.291
Hansen test (Prob> χ 2) 0.945 0.975 0.971 0.995 0.179 0.138 0.958 0.853
Food insecurity measure
ODA per GDP -5.92 -5.75 -3.56 -3.56
2.24 2.08 2.88 2.95
net ODA per capita -0.78 -1.59 -0.33 -0.13
2.21 2.97 1.72 1.27
ODA per GDP squared 2.52 2.44 1.59 1.60
3.06 4.12 2.85 2.83
Governance -0.36 -0.55 -0.11 -0.11 -0.35 -0.85 0.10 0.26
1.68 1.04 1.50 1.13 1.81 1.72 1.09 0.64
ODA*governance -0.35 0.01
3.29 1.09
net ODA*governance -0.33 -0.08
1.87 1.37
N of observations
N of groups
AR2 test (Prob>z) 0.116 0.137 0.129 0.156 0.111 0.110 0.141 0.187
Hansen test (Prob> χ 2) 0.954 0.893 0.903 0.946 0.796 0.721 0.896 0.918
323
85
323
85
with net ODA per capita with ODA per GDP squared
323
85
311
83
Undernourished Underweight Undernourished Underweight
Undernourished Underweight Undernourished Underweight
with policy index as governance excluding China and Brazil
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of loans is conditioned on governance also when food insecurity is approximated by the 
prevalence of underweight children. 
 
Table 4. The effects of who gives aid and how it is given on recipients’ food insecurity 
 
Regressions were run with robust standard errors and time dummies. The first number next to each variable is the 
coefficient; the number below is the corresponding t-statistic. Bold font represents significance at least at the 10% 
level. The regressions were controlled for the same variables as those in Table 2. 
 
Looking at the differential impact of budget support versus program/project aid on food 
security, the proportion of aid disbursed as budget support is mostly insignificant. Moreover, 
the interaction variable of budget support with governance is negative and significant in only 
one of the two regressions. These results suggest that food security is not widely affected by 
whether aid is implemented through projects or transferred to recipients directly and that in 
countries with better governance budget support might not have the ability to bolster food 
security more than in countries with worse governance.   
Table 5 presents the results of regressions that look at the impact of aid when divided into 
agricultural, social, economic, and other. Social aid reduces recipients’ food security most 
consistently and significantly, with a significant effect in all four regressions. Economic aid 
also appears to have a positive impact on food security, even though it is significant only when 
food insecurity is measured through the prevalence of undernourishment. Finally, agricultural 
aid and other aid do not have any significant relationship with food security in their own right, 
even though the effect of agricultural aid is positively conditioned on governance.  
  
Food insec. measure
Aid (ODA) per GDP -0.92 -0.61 -0.22 -0.20
2.47 2.18 1.99 1.84
Bilateral aid -0.57 -0.66 -0.31 -0.21
1.91 2.26 1.93 1.61
Multilateral aid -0.60 -0.68 -2.11 -2.56
2.16 2.31 3.82 2.88
Grants -1.32 -1.16 -0.25 -0.31
3.29 2.31 1.91 2.10
Loans 0.12 0.68 -0.04 -0.17
0.35 1.32 0.91 1.67
Budget support 5.29 8.87 5.73 5.83
1.48 1.82 1.51 1.55
Governance -0.41 -0.61 0.16 -0.02 -0.94 -0.79 -0.31 -0.51 -0.72 -0.86 -0.12 -0.11
1.92 2.28 1.51 0.20 3.39 1.67 1.84 0.69 1.85 1.82 0.55 0.48
Bil. aid* gov -0.26 -0.12
2.51 2.28
Multi.aid*gov -0.05 -0.10
1.48 1.56
Grants*gov -0.33 0.01
1.85 0.21
Loans*governance -0.18 -0.14
1.69 2.04
Budget support*gov -1.76 -0.22
1.78 1.29
N of observations
N of groups
AR2 test (Prob>z) 0.174 0.082 0.130 0.155 0.059 0.165 0.210 0.156 0.101 0.216 0.150 0.148
Hansen test (Prob>χ2) 0.948 0.914 0.938 0.925 0.262 0.919 0.963 0.935 0.319 0.306 0.957 0.960
Undernourished Underweight
323
85 85 85
Undernourished Underweight
323
Undernourished Underweight
323
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Table 5. The effects of where aid goes on recipients’ food security 
 
Regressions were run with robust standard errors and time dummies. The first number next 
to each variable is the coefficient; the number below is the corresponding t-statistic. Bold font 
represents significance at least at the 10% level. The regressions were controlled for the same 
variables as those in Table 2. 
 
The finding vis-à-vis social and economic aid is interesting yet not completely unforeseen. 
These two aid categories include aid disbursed to improve water, sanitation, and health 
services, raise education levels, and provide livelihoods for recipients, and as such were 
anticipated to strengthen food security at least to some extent. The more surprising finding is 
with regard to agricultural aid, which I expected to have the most significant positive effect of 
the four types of aid and discovered none. This lack of significance does not imply that 
agricultural aid cannot play a meaningful role in strengthening food security, given that the 
contrary has often been proven on the micro level (e.g. IYCN, 2011). Instead, the more likely 
explanation is that not all aid to agriculture strengthens food security, a suspicion reinforced 
by the fact that agricultural aid is also the type of aid whose influence is most significantly 
conditioned on governance.  
 
Discussion  
Much of the data available for quantitative cross-country studies is believed to be imperfect. 
This might not be true regarding data on aid but is almost certainly true regarding data on food 
security and on governance, two of the main concepts examined within this paper. However, I 
have tried hard to overcome this problem by providing a number of robustness checks on the 
results obtained. Consequently, the findings paint a picture that perhaps does not replicate but 
surely at least closely resembles the reality. 
Food insecurity measure
Agricultural aid -0.19 -0.15 -0.07 -0.16
1.48 1.21 0.94 1.27
Social infrastructure aid -1.77 -1.66 -0.57 -0.56
2.88 1.87 1.90 1.66
Economic infrastructure aid -1.67 -1.17 -0.31 -0.82
2.34 2.11 0.59 1.27
Other aid -0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.02
1.49 1.31 1.11 1.53
Governance -0.43 -1.96 -0.08 -0.28
1.97 2.54 2.17 0.42
Agricultural aid*governance -0.24 -0.16
1.69 2.19
Social aid*governance -0.21 -0.01
1.68 1.07
Economic aid*governance -0.31 -0.06
1.74 1.29
Other aid * governance 0.01 -1.88
0.08 1.28
N of observations
N of groups
AR2 test (Prob>z) 0.080 0.232 0.134 0.167
Hansen test (Prob>χ2) 0.830 0.844 0.976 0.988
85
Undernourished Underweight
323
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My first key finding is that development assistance has a possibly small but significant 
positive impact on food security, whether measured by the prevalence of undernourishment or 
of underweight children. The magnitude of the regression coefficients is somewhat sensitive to 
changing specifications but the empirical models that tested the aid-food security relationship 
consistently showed positive significance. The conclusion that aid bolsters food security is 
further supported by the fact that there is likely to be a slight downward bias in the results as 
aid and food security have a naturally negative association - since more aid goes to countries 
with lower food security. 
The second key finding is that the effect of aid and the degree to which it is influenced by 
the quality of recipients’ governance varies based on the type of aid provided. When looked at 
as a uniform flow, aid appeared to be conditioned on governance only when food security was 
expressed as undernourishment prevalence. However, in line with my hypotheses, I found 
bilateral aid and loan aid to be conditioned on governance more consistently and significantly 
than their counterpart types of aid – multilateral and grant aid – as well as aid in general. I also 
expected to find budget support to be more influenced by governance than program and project 
aid since, similar to loan aid, it requires a greater amount of action and discipline from the 
receiving governments but the results failed to validate this view.  
Because many aid agencies use stricter policy conditionality when disbursing budget 
support than with other aid instruments, the first explanation for this non-finding that comes to 
mind is that budget support is provided only to countries with above-average governance scores 
and hence governance can no longer appear to condition its effectiveness as it would if budget 
support were provided to all developing countries indiscriminately. A cursory look at the data, 
however, discredits this argument. A simple t-test showed that the recipients of budget support 
had actually significantly lower governance scores than non-recipients. An alternative 
explanation could be that the size of aid flows in the form of budget support is too small relative 
to the size of program and project aid flows to uncover any statistical significance. This 
question would, however, undoubtedly benefit from further research. 
The same can be said with regard to the effects of agricultural aid. When looking at the 
impact of different aid modalities on food security independent of the influence of governance, 
bilateral aid, multilateral aid, grant aid, and social and economic aid were found to have a 
significantly positive effect as expected, while agricultural aid – hypothesized to have a 
stronger positive influence on food security than aid to any other sector – appeared 
insignificant. This finding is surprising since most aid projects focused specifically on 
strengthening food security revolve around agriculture and have often been proven successful. 
The consistent significance of the agricultural aid-governance interaction term implies that the 
likely explanation is that agricultural aid is highly susceptible to the quality of recipients’ 
institutions and policies and influences food security positively only in countries with better 
governance.  
Nevertheless, only a more in-depth analysis would be able to elucidate the underlying 
mechanisms more clearly. Further research could also explore in more detail the interactions 
among the different aid modalities, for example the different effects of grants versus 
concessional loans to agriculture. However, such studies would probably be more accurate if 
undertaken at an individual country level. 
 
Conclusion 
Due to persistent population growth, stagnating crop yields, and deteriorating climate 
conditions, food insecurity is likely to pose ever-increasing global challenges. In this study, I 
demonstrate that aid, despite its many deficiencies, can play a positive role in addressing the 
issue. Moreover, I show that the impact of aid on food security is heterogeneous in that some 
aid instruments have a more positive impact than others in their own right while others are 
16 
 
more susceptible to the quality of recipients’ institutions and policies. Future research could 
deepen the robustness of these findings and extend the use of the aid categorization to the 
assessment of aid effectiveness in achieving other desirable development outcomes, such as 
growth or economic equality. 
[1] The way the body metabolizes the food consumed, influenced by the type of food, one’s health, and sanitary conditions (FAO).   
[3] ‘Other’ aid comprises primarily aid to industry, construction, trade, and tourism. 
[4] Certainly, even non-poor people can be food insecure but such occurrence is relatively uncommon. Moreover, since internationally 
comparable measures of poverty are scarce, food insecurity can even be regarded an acceptable proxy variable for poverty. 
[5] In the robustness regressions with the weighted policy index, I exclude trade openness as it is included in the index. 
[6] In 2SLS regressions where the interaction term with WGI is used, I instrument for it by its multiplication with all the instrumental variables 
(Wooldridge, 2002) 
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